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I. ARGUMENT 
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO FILE HIS COMPLAINT FOR ADDITIONAL 
INCOME BENEFITS UNTIL JULY 20, 2016, WHICH WAS MORE THAN ONE 
YEAR AFTER SURETY'S LAST PAYMENT OF INCOME BENEFITS ON JUNE 
22, 201S, AND THUS, FACIALLY UNTIMELY FOR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS PURPOSES UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 72-706(3). BECAUSE THE 
STATUTE IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR 
CONSTRUING THE PHRASE "DATE OF LAST PAYMENT OF INCOME 
BENEFITS" IN THE MANNER ARGUED FOR BY RESPONDENT SO AS TO 
GIVE HIM MORE THAN ONE YEAR WITHIN WIDCH TO HA VE FILED HIS 
COMPLAINT 
What this case ultimately is about is whether Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) bars Austin's claim 
for additional income benefits. The statute provides that "if income benefits have been paid and 
discontinued more than four (4) years from the date of the accident causing injury ... the claimant 
shall have one ( 1) year from the date of the last payment of income benefits within which to make 
and file with the Commission an application requesting a hearing for additional income benefits." 
The case, however, has been caught up with issues over what "last payment" means and how it 
relates to the actual date when Austin filed his Complaint for additional income benefits; over 
whether Idaho Code § 72-806 required a written notice of change of status when Surety issued to 
Austin, in care of his attorney, its check for the concluding payment of the monetary value of 
Austin's 11 % whole person permanent physical impairment (PPI) rating; over whether Idaho Code 
§ 72-604 tolled Idaho Code§ 72-706(3); and over whether Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) was not tolled 
because Surety substantially complied with Idaho Code § 72-806 through the information it 
provide to Austin and his attorney on the written statement attached to the concluding PPI payment. 
In this Reply Brief, Appellants will first address Austin's argument that independent of any 
issues regarding Idaho Code§ 72-806 and § 72-604 pertaining to tolling of the statute of limitation, 
the Court should, nonetheless, affirm the Commission's determination that his Complaint was 
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timely filed under the one year limitation provision of Idaho Code § 72-706(3). He argues that the 
phrase "from the date of last payment of income benefits" is "ambiguous." Respondent's Brief, 
p. 15. He contends that the Court should construe the date of last payment on income benefits" to 
be the date when periodic payments would have ended if all periodic payments had been made bi-
weekly." Respondent's Brief, pages 19-20. Before addressing Austin's argument, however, it is 
important to reiterate a number of undisputed and stipulated facts. These facts are relevant not 
only tq Austin's statutory construction argument, but also to all the other issues on appeal. 
Austin's accident and injury occurred on November 20, 2008. He did not begin incurring 
temporary disability, however, until June 2012. Surety paid him total temporary disability benefits 
("TTD") for the period of June 9, 2012 through July 18, 2004. In the summer of 2014, Dr. Fellars 
declared Austin at maximum medical improvement and rated him as having a permanent physical 
impairment (PPI) rating of 11 % whole person. Surety on July 18, 2014 issued a written Notice 
of Claims Status (NOCS) advising Austin that his temporary total disability benefits, based upon 
Dr. Fellars' report, would stop effective July 18,2014, and that Surety would start to issue income 
benefits to Austin for Dr. Fellar' s 11 % whole person PPI rating. A copy of Dr. Fellars' report was 
included with the NOCS. 
The NOCS specified that the rating was 11 % whole person, which equated to a value of 
$18,694.50, which would be paid at the rate of $339.90 per week, payable bi-weekly. The NOCS 
also indicated that payments for the rating would continue until the rating was paid in full. 
Surety's payments to Austin of income benefits for PPI commenced on July 19, 2014. On 
October 31, 2014, Austin's prior attorney1 requested a benefit payment summary. The summary 
was received on November 20, 2014. The summary included an itemization of the income benefits 
1 Austin was represented by Albert Matsuura until Mr. Matsuura's death in the summer of 2018. 
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paid for the permanent impairment rating from lhe start of those payments through the period 
ending November 21, 2014. Surety continued to make payments for PPI throughout the remainder 
of 2014 and inlo June 2015. 
On June 22, 2015, Surety issued check 270024820 payable to Austin in care of his 
attorney. The payment amount was $2,379.30. The check also had a written "Statement" attached 
to it. The Statement instructed the recipient to 'DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT 
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED BELOW." The 
Statement indicated that the check was in lhe amount of $2,379.30; lhat it was payment for 
"Permanent Partial Scheduled/Impairment [;]" and thal il was "PPI Final Payment." 
It is also undisputed and stipulated that 270024820, issued June 22, 2015, cleared Surety's 
bank on July 10, 2015. From the clearance date, it can be inferred that Austin and his attorney did, 
in fact, receive the check and its attached Statement prior to July 10, 2015. 
Austin's attorney did not file a Complaint with the Industrial Commission on Austin's 
behalf for additional income benefits until July 20, 2016, more than a year after issuance on June 
22, 2015 Surety's concluding payment of income benefits for PPL 
Austin's permanent physical impairment rating of 11 % whole person converted to 55 
weeks of income benefits (500 weeks x .11 = 55 weeks) payable at a weekly rate of $339.90 for a 
total monetary value of $18,694.50 ($339.90 x 55 = $18,694.50). Surety's first biweekly payment 
was issued for the period July 19, 2014 through August 1, 2014. Joint Exhibit B. As of the 
payment in November 2014 for the period from November 8, 2014 through November 21 , 2014, 
Surety had made 9 biweekly payments, or payments for 18 of the 55 weeks of benefits. Joint 
Exhibit B. Surety continued to make the biweekly payments during the remainder of 2014 and 
into June 2015. As of the period ending June 19, 2015, it had completed 24 periodic payments or 
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the equivalent or 48 weeks. Surety then elected to pay the 7 weeks balance of benefits left as of 
June 20, 2015 in a single sum, resulting in issuance on June 22, 2015 of the "PPI Final Payment" 
check for$ 2,379.30 ($2,379.30 I $339.90 = 7). 
As previously noted, Austin argues that independent of any issues regarding Idaho Code § 
72-806 and§ 72-804, the Court should, nonetheless, affirm the Commission's determination that 
his Complaint was timely filed under the one year limitation provision of Idaho Code§ 72-706(3). 
He argues the phrase "from the date of last payment of income benefits" is "ambiguous." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 15. He contends that the Court should construe the date of last payment on 
income benefits" to be the date when periodic payments would have ended if all periodic payments 
had been made bi-weekly." Respondent's Brief, pages 19-20. 
The first problem with Austin's argument is that Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) is not ambiguous. 
the words "last payment" are plain on their face, unambiguous, and require no interpretation. Well-
settled Idaho law provides that statutory words must be given "their plain, usual and ordinary 
meanings."' Salinas v. Bridgeview Estates, 162 Idaho 91, 93,394 P. 3d 793, 795 (2017). Black's 
Law Dictionary defines "payment" as "the performance of an obligation by the delivery of money 
or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharges of the obligation." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1243 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 9th ed., West 2009). Merriam-Webster defines the adjective 
"last" as "the next before the present: most recent." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
hllm,,://www .mcrriam-wcbster.com/dictionarv/la-.t (accessed August 9, 2017). Thus, by definition, 
"last payment" means the most recent delivery of money in partial or full discharge of an 
obligation. That occurred with issuance of the concluding payment for PPI on June 22, 2015. 
The phrase "final payment" is clear on its face . It strains credulity to contend that the phrase needs 
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to be otherwise construed, particularly in Austin's case where the final payment check issued June 
22, 2015 stated that it was a "PPI Final Payment." 
Second, the date of issuance as the date of payment is consistent with Court case law 
interpreting Idaho Code 72-706(3). In Nelson v. City of B01111ers Ferry, 149 Idaho 29, 232 P.3d 
807 (2010), Nelson had been injured on October 13, 2000. The State Insurance Fund (SIF) paid 
Nelson various types of income benefits for intermittent periods of time between 200 t and 2006. 
SIF ended benefit payments on June 5, 2006, Nelson filed a complaint for additional income 
benefits on August 23, 2006. The Commission concluded that the Complaint was not timely 
because Nelson had not been receiving income benefits on what would have been the four-year 
anniversary on October 13, 2004 of his October 13, 2000 accident. Consequently, the Commission 
ruled that he only had until the fifth-year anniversary on October 13, 2005 to have filed a complaint 
and, since he hadn't done so, his August 23, 2006 complaint was untimely. The Court reversed. 
The Court in Nelson reviewed versions of Idaho Code § 72-706 that existed prior to 1991 
when the legislature amended subsection (2) and added current subsections (3) and (4). It also 
discussed its holding in Walters v. Blincoe 's Magic Valley Packing Co., 117 Idaho 239, 787 P.2d 
225 ( 1989 ), which had been decided under a different statutory scheme. The Court in Nelson 
explained that 
As the statute now stands, if the discontinuance occurs before the expiration of 
the four-year period, then subsection (2) applies. If the discontinuance occurs after 
the expiration of the four-year period, then subsection (3) applies. Under this 
construction the claimant would always have at least five years after the accident 
or first manifestation within which to file the application for additional income 
benefits. That is the obvious reason for choosing the four-year and one-year periods 
of time in subsection (3). The combination of the two gives at least five years from 
the date of the accident causing injury or first manifestation of the occupational 
disease within which to file if income benefits have been paid and discontinued. To 
eliminate the inequity that could occur if those benefits are discontinued shortly 
before or after the expiration of the five-year period, subsection (3) gives the 
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claimant one year from the date of the last payment if the discontinuance occurs 
"more than four ( 4) years" from the date of the accident or first manifestation. 
In this case, the four-year period expired on October 13, 2004. Although the 
payment of income benefits had been discontinued prior to that date and were not 
being made on that date, pursuant to I.C. § 72-306(2), [sic] Nelson had one more 
year within which to request additional income benefits. The payment of income 
benefits resumed on December 2, 2004, before the expiration of that statute of 
limitations, and continued after the statute of limitations provided in I.C. § 72-
306(2) [sic] had run. Under those circumstances, the statute of limitations in LC. § 
72-306(3) [sic] should apply. 
149 Idaho at 33-34, 232 P. 3d at 812. 
Third the Parties stipulated before the Commission that "Defendants issued the final 
payment of PPI to Austin in care of his attorney on June 22, 2015, by check number 2700024820 
in the amount of $2,379.30." Finding IO. 
Fourth, the Commission considered Austin's argument "that the Commission should 
consider the date the last payment of benefits would have been due had Surety not made an advance 
payment of seven weeks' worth of PPI benefit payments in a "lump sum" fashion. That date is no 
earlier than August 8, 2015." See Finding 24. But the Commission implicitly rejected that 
argument since it expressly found in Finding 28 that "Surety's last payment of income benefits 
occurred on June 22, 2015. Under the provision of Idaho Code § 72-706(3), it appears that 
Claimant had until June 22, 2016 to file his complaint, which he did not do." 
Fifth, Austin's argument thwarts the clear intent of Idaho Code § 72-706(3) because it 
would allow him more than one full year from when the final payment for PPI was issued to file 
his Complaint for additional income benefits. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 6 
Sixth, even though Surety's issuance on June 22, 2015 of a concluding payment of 7 weeks 
of benefits started the statute of limitations running from then instead of from August 8, 2016., 
Austin and his attorney received one full year to file a Complaint. Nothing regarding Surety's 
payment in any way cut short Austin's one year to file a Complaint. Moreover, nothing about the 
payment thwarted, limited, affected or prejudiced Austin's one-year right to file a Complaint. A 
comment the Referee made in his proposed Finding 58 seems an accurate bottom line assessment 
of Austin's argument. "Nothing in the record suggests Claimant had circled August 8, 2016 as the 
date by which he had to file suit. Instead it appears from the record he simply failed to file suit by 
the time frame allowed by Idaho Code § 72-706(3) and is searching now for a way to escape the 
reality of his predicament." 
Seventh, the cases from other jurisdictions cited by Austin are not relevant for two reasons. 
As noted above, the statutory language is not ambiguous, and Idaho law provides that where 
statutory language is unambiguous, then "' legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should 
not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."' Verska 
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011). In such 
circumstances, the legislation "'speaks for itself and must be given the interpretation the language 
clearly implies."' Id. at 895, 508. The other reason is that the cases cited by Austin illustrate the 
danger of relying on cases from other jurisdiction with different statutory frameworks. They 
simply do not translate to Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. This is amply illustrated by the 
principal case relied on by Austin, which is Allen v. IBP, Inc., 219 Neb. 424, 363 N. W. 2d 520 
(1985). 
As noted in the Allen court's opinion, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-139 (Reissue 1984) required 
that a commutation of periodic payments for permanent disability "or claimed permanent 
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disability" be submitted to the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court for approval. Id. at 426, 
523. Nebraska had a related statute, Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 48-140 (Reissue 1984), which required that 
all settlement agreements had to be approved by the compensation court and would not "final and 
not subject to readjustment" unless the agreement had been submitted and approved. Id. 
Furthermore, since 1933 the Nebraska Supreme Court had construed "'[a] commuted award"' as 
extending "'over the full period originally covered by the same."' Id. at 426-427, 523. 
Allen was injured on January 16, 1979. IBP paid him 12 weeks of temporary total disability 
benefits. Then on October 25, 1979, IBP paid Allen a lump sum payment of $2,223.26, which 
represented 288 weeks of compensation for a 5% permanent partial disability. No settlement or 
release was ever executed, and the lump sum payment was not approved by the compensation 
court. In 1982, Allen began experiencing further temporary disability. Allen brought a proceeding 
before the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court in 1982 for additional compensation. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-137 provided for a two-year statute of limitation "in any case" when 
payments of compensation had been made but which "shall not take effect until the expiration of 
two years from the time of the making of the last payment." Id. at 425-426, 522-523. The pivotal 
issue in the case was whether the two-year statute of limitation began to run from the October 25, 
1979 lump sum payment by IBP; or whether, because there had not court approval of the lump 
sum, the statute of limitation began "to run when the last of the 288 weekly payments would have 
been paid had then been paid periodically[.]" Id. at 426, 523. In the initial proceeding below 
before a single judge, Allen's petition for additional benefits was dismissed. Id. at 424, 522. Allen 
sought rehearing from a three-judge panel, which reversed the sole judge and awarded benefits to 
Allen. Id. IBP then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which affirmed the award to Allen. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 8 
It is apparent that the Court affirmed because of the statutory framework which required 
compensation court approval and its holding concerning the scope of a commuted award. It stated, 
Where compensation has been commuted by agreement and paid in a lump sum 
without court approval, § 48-139, such a payment is not final; it is nothing more 
than an advance payment, and the statute of limitation does not begin to run until 
the last periodic payment would have been paid, had payments been made in 
installments. To hold otherwise would, as here, permit employers to thwart 
claims of employees by imposing finality contrary to applicable statutes. 
Id. at 427-428, 523-524 (Emphasis added). In short, the logic of Allen has no relevance to Austin's 
case. 
For the above reasons, the Court should reject Austin's argument and should conclude, as 
the Commission did in Finding 28, that "Surety's last payment of income benefits occurred on 
June 22, 2015[,]" and that "[u]nder the provision of Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) . . . Claimant had 
until June 22, 2016 to file his complaint, which he did not do." Of Course, the Court must go on 
to address the appellate issues involving Idaho Code § 72-806 and § 72-604, since, the 
Commission, after finding that Austin's Complaint was facially untimely, also correctly noted at 
the end of Finding 28 that "the requirements of Idaho Code of Idaho Code § 72706(3) may be 
tolled under certain circumstances." 
B. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS MATTER OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT 
IDAHO CODE§ 72-806 REQUIRED SURETY TO ISSUE A NOTICE OF CHANGE 
OF STATUS WHEN IT COMPLETED PAYMENT ON JUNE 22, 2015 OF THE 
INCOME BENEFITS FOR RESPONDENT'S 11 % WHOLE PERSON 
PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT RATING 
Austin argues that the Commission correctly concluded that Idaho Code § 72-806 required 
a written notice of change of status when the Surety made the concluding payment of the monetary 
value of Austin's 11 % whole person permanent physical impairment (PPI) rating because the 
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concluding payment .. was a change in the status or condition of Mr. Austin's income benefits." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 7. (Emphasis in original.) 
Idaho Code § 72-806 states, in part, that "A workman shall receive written notice within 
fifteen ( 15) days of any change or status or condition, including, but not limited to, the denial, 
reduction or cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or 
indirectly affects the level to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled." 
The Commission in its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration at page 3 stated that 
Idaho Code § 72-806 "requires a NCOS when PPI benefits stop" because "[t]he plain language of 
the statute treats the cessation or final payment of PPI benefits the same as other benefits, such as 
cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects 
the level to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled "for a NCOS from Defendants." 
Earlier, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, the Commission reasoned on page 
14 that because Austin's .. periodic payment of PPI benefits ... came to an end[,]" "[t]hen the level 
(amount) of money periodically received was therefore '°affected"' by the receipt of the last 
payment, for Claimant received no further payments thereafter." Thus, reasoned the Commission, 
the "plain language of the statute" required a notice of change of status. 
What Austin and the Commission, however, both fail to adequately address is that in 
construing a statute to determine the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of its language, "effect 
must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, 
or redundant." Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214,216,254 P. 3d 1210, 1212 
(2011 ). (Emphasis added.) 
The critical point regarding Idaho Code § 72-806 is that a cessation of benefits alone is not 
what triggers the need for written notice. The triggering event is the "cessation of ... monetary 
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compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects the level to which he might presently 
or ultimately be entitled." (Emphasis added.) In Austin's case, however, the level of benefits to 
which he "might ... be entitled" did not change when the "PPI Final Payment" was issued on June 
22, 2015. 
The Parties stipulated that Surety provided a written notice of change of status to Austin 
on July 18, 2014, advising him he had reached maximum medical improvement and had been 
given a permanent physical impairment rating of I I~ whole person by Dr. Fellars. Further, the 
NOCS informed Austin that he was entitled to income benefits for impairment rating in the total 
amount or S 18,694.50 to be paid bi-weekly at the rate of $339.90 per week until the rating was 
"paid in full." Additionally, the Parties also stipulate that Surety made payments against the 
impairment award until it was paid in full on June 22, 2015, with a check marked "PPI Final 
Payment" in the amount of $2,379.30. 
The benefit of $18,694.50 to which Austin became entitled was determinable and lixed in 
2014 as soon as he was rated as having a PPI of 11 % whole person. At the time the NOCS was 
issued on July 18, 2014 those benefits were prospective. They were a level or benefits to which 
Austin "might presently or ultimately be entitled." Hence, an NOCS was required under Idaho 
Code § 72-806 in 20 I 4 when the rating occurred. Surety met that obligation with the NOCS it 
sent to Austin on July 18, 2014. When, however, completion of payment of the rating occurred 
on June 22, 2015, it did not change the level of the rating benefit All that occurred when the "PPI 
Final Payment" was made is that that the rating benefit completed the movement from a 
prospective benefit to one fully .iclualized. The level of benefits did not change. Austin received 
exuctly what he was told he would receive in the July 18, 2014 NOCS. The "PPI Final Payment" 
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did not "affect" the "level" of the "monetary compensation benefits'' lo which Austin "might ... 
be entitled." 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should conclude that the Commission erred as a matter 
of law in determining that a notice of change of status wa~ required because of the June 22, 2014 
"PPI Final Paymenl.'' 
C. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER IN CONCLUDING THAT SURETY 
ACTED WILFULLY WHEN IT FAILED TO ISSUE A FORM 8 NOTICE OF 
CHANGE OF STATUS WHEN IT COMPLETED PAYMENT ON JUNE 22, 2015 
OF THE INCOME BENEFITS FOR RESPONDENT'S 11 % PERMANENT 
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT RATING 
Austin next makes two arguments. Au!>tin next makes two arguments. These are based on 
a conclusion that a notice of change of status was required by ldaho Code § 72-806 when the "PPI 
Final Payment'" was made. The first of his two arguments is that the Commission correctly 
determined that Surety's failure to file such an NOCS was "willful" under Idaho Code § 72-604, 
and, therefore, that the statute of I imitation of Idaho Code § 72-706(3) was tolled by § 72.604. 
Reply Brief, pages I 0-12, 
The Commission in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order merely stnted in 
Finding 46 that "Because Defendants did not is!>Ue the required Idaho Code § 72-806 notice, the 
limitation provisions of Idaho Code § 72-706 are tolled by operation of Idaho Code § 72-604.'' 
The Commission did not make specific findings over whether Surety "willfully fail[ed] or 
refuse[d] to file the report as required ... by section 72-806, Idaho Code[.]" A willful failure to 
refusal to file is an essential requirement under Idaho Code § 72-604. The Commission, however, 
sought to remedy the apparent deficiency in its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. 
The Commission made two points in the latter Order. First, it !-,lated that "a finding of 
willfulness is implicit in our finding that the plain language of the statute [§ 72-806] requires a 
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NOCS upon the cessation of any class of benefits. Therefore, we specifically conclude that 
Defendants' failure was willful us anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-604." Second, it ci1ed its 
decision in Mead v. Sw{/i Transportation, 2015 IIC 0041 (2015), for the proposilion that when a 
defendant is "aware of the legal requirements of the statute requiring filing, but failed" to make a 
required filing, then the failure, "[a]lthough not malicious [,]" is "willful." ln then concluded 
regarding Austin's case that "becam,e there is no ambiguity in the plain language of statute 
requiring a NOCS when there is a cessation of benefits, Defendant's failure to submit the NOCS 
was similarly without lawful excu~e and willful." 
Appellants contend that the Commission erred us a matter of law in concluding that the 
failure to submit an NOCS wa.,; willful because it never considered whether the fact!-. raised issues 
as to whether there were lawful grounds to excuse Surety's failure to file an NOCS upon the "PPI 
Final Payment,'' assuming such an NOCS was required. 
More specilically, Appellunts argue in their Opening Brief that Court has recognized 
variou~ excuse!-> legally sufficient to preclude a finding that conduct was "willful." Appellants 
further argue that the Court's decision in Poss 11. MeekerMachine Shop, I 09 Idaho 921, 923, 7 I 2 
P. 2d 621, 626 ( 1985) implies that substantial compliance with Idaho Code § 72-806 may be such 
an exception. 
Appellant's argument is contained at pages 13-19 of their Opening Brief and will not be 
repeated here. Appellants, however, reiterate here their conclusion that the Commi!.Sion erred a!. 
a maller of law by failing to consider whether "substantial compliance" with * 72-806 is a cause 
sufficient to legally excused the failure lo file an NOCS when payment of a PPI rating is completed. 
Appellant~ then proceeded al pages 19 through 22 of their Opening Brief to argue thal the 
!,tipulated and undisputed facts raised the issue of substantial compliance and that the 
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Commission's failed to apply a "substantial compliance" legal standard to those facts. Thal 
contention leads to the second of Austin's arguments alluded to above. Austin argues that 
Appellants failed to establish "substantial compliance.'' 
D. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO 
APPLY A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE STANDARD TO THE STIPULATED 
AND UNDISPUTED FACTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT REASON EXISTS TO EXCUSE SURETY'S FAIL URE TO ISSUE A 
FORM 8 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF STATUS WHEN IT COMPLETED 
PAYMENT ON JUNE 22, 2015 OF THE INCOME BENEFITS FOR 
RESPONDENT'S 11 % PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT RA TING 
Austin's argument regarding substantial compliance is al pages 13-14 of his Reply Brief. 
Essentiully, he claims there was no "substantial compliance" because the Statement Surety 
provided with its June 22, 2015 final payment or the PPI rating did not provide Austin with an 
"effective date and reasons" for why his PPI payments were ending. His argument doesn't make 
logical sense, as will become clear shortly. 
The Commission has adopted a form known as Form 8 for reporting a "Notice of Claim 
Status'' for purpose-; of Idaho Code § 72-806. 
The Commission's Form 8 can be found at Idaho Industrial Commission, Find a Form, 
Adjuster Forms, Notice of Change of Status (IC - 8), https://iic.idaho.!.!o\/find-a-form/. A copy 
of a Form 8 can also be found in the Agency Record at p. 3 la. That copy of the Form 8 a is part 
of the Commission's "Advanced Level Student Book" which the Commission took judicial notice 
of pursuant to Referee's Order Granting Motion for Judicial Notice of Publication of the Idaho 
Industrial Commission. R., pp. 73-74. The "Advanced Level Student Book" is used by the 
Commission's Claims and Benefits Department for its Certified Idaho Workers Compensation 
Specialist Learning Course. See R., p. 34. 
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The Form 8 says that "This is to notify you of the DENIAL OR CHANGE OF ST ATVS 
of your workers• compensation in the statement checked below." The first box on Form 8 is for 
"Your claims is denied" and the box asks for a "Reason." The second box is for "Your benefit 
payment will be" either "Reduced" or "Increased." That box also asks for a "Reason" and requires 
an "Effective Date." The third box is for "Your benefit payments will be stopped." It also asks 
for a "Reason" and an "Effective Date." The fourth box is for "You claim is being investigated" 
and requests a date for when "A decision should be made by." The fifth box is for "Other" and 
request an "Explanation" and an "Effective Date." 
Appellants contend that the Statement attached to the final PPI payment check contained 
all the material information that would have been contained on a Form 8 Form. In assessing the 
facts as they relate to the issue of substantial compliance, it's important to start with the July 18. 
2014 NOCS for context. Austin and his attorney were aware from that NOCS that Austin had 
received an permanent rating 11 % of the whole person from Dr. Fellars, that the total monetary 
value of the rating was $18,694.50, and that it would be paid out in bi-weekly installments at the 
rate of $339.90 per week "until the award has been paid in full." The Statement attached to the 
June 22, 2015 check for $2,379.30 clearly indicated that the payment was for "Permanent Partial 
Scheduled/Impairment" "From" 06/20/2015. and that the payment was the "PPI Final Payment." 
Both the check and the Statement also contained the amount of the check and the check date of 
"06/22/2015." Thus, Austin and his attorney were aware from the Statement that there would be 
no further payment of income benefits for permanent impairment after June 22, 20 l 5 because the 
permanent impairment rating had been fully paid out with the check of June 22, 2015. 
Consequently, contrary to Austin's assertion, the Statement clearly informed him that his PPI 
benefits were stopping effective June 22, 2015. and that they were stopping because the June 22, 
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2015 check fully paid out his impairment. That's why Austin's argument makes no sense. 
Moreover, the above facts unquestionably raise an issue of "substantial compliance" with Idaho 
Code§ 72-806 which the Commission did not address. That, in Appellant's judgment, is reversible 
error. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons contained herein and in Appellants' Opening Brief, the Court enter a 
decision in favor of Appellants on all issues raised on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Thi/,f/J_ day of February, 2019. 
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